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I. INTRODUCTION
Although tax scholars have long scrutinized progressive taxation
from a variety of vantage points,' most of my academic friends take it
as given that progressive tax rates are fair. The recent popularity of
the flat tax idea,2 however, is testimony to the possibility that Ameri-
cans are not as convinced of the fairness of progressive taxes as a sam-
pling of leftist academics might suggest.3 So what is fair about
progressive taxation? Why have taxpayers accepted progressive rate
structures for so long?4 Are progressive taxes compatible with the
philosophical underpinnings of our society?
A small, but swelling, wave of recent tax policy scholarship ques-
tions the assumptions on which our analytical approaches depend.5
1. See generally ROBERT NoziciK, ANARCIy, STATE, AN UTOPIA (1974); Calvin R.
Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 85
(1996); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of
the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 Am. J. TAX Po'y
221 (1995).
2. By flat, of course, I refer to proportional taxes where the rate of tax is flat,
although the amount certainly is not.
3. Although Steven Forbes often gets credit for the flat tax idea in the popular me-
dia, House Majority leader Dick Armey introduced a more complete version of
this idea in the House. See H.R. 4585, 103d Cong. (1994), revised and reintro-
duced as H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. (1995) by Congressman Armey on July 19, 1995.
Senator Richard C. Shelby, R-Ala., introduced a revised version in the Senate.
The Armey-Shelby flat tax, as well as Steven Forbes's platform actually derived
from an earlier work: ROBERT E. HALL & ALvIN BABusHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed.
1995). See generally Maria Recio, Smaller Cuts, IRS Bill 16.4(a) & (d) Quiet Tax
Reform Rallying Cry, KNIGHT REDDER Tm. Bus. NEws, Apr. 14, 1999; Gerald F.
Seib, Steve Forbes: Evolving Toward 2000 Decision, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1998,
at A24 (crediting Steve Forbes, a Republican Presidential contender in 1996, with
helping to make "Flat Tax" a household name by focusing his electoral platform
on a flat tax proposal).
The recent "flat tax" proposals would do more than change the tax rate struc-
ture. They would also significantly change the tax base and are actually con-
sumption taxes, rather than true proportional income taxes. While this
important distinction was reasonably clear to tax professionals, it was mostly in-
visible to the lay public. Most people seemed not to understand that only wage
income, and not investment income, would be part of the tax base under the
Armey-Shelby proposal (and similarly, under the Forbes flat tax). Under the
USA tax, deposits and investments would have been deductible, resulting in the
economic equivalent of a tax on consumed wage income.
4. I am grateful to Edwin S. Cohen for pointing out that the federal income tax has
always exhibited some degree of progressivity and that progressivity itself seems
not to have been at issue when the tax was originally enacted. (Actually, Profes-
sor Cohen, in true law professor form, raised the point as a question.)
5. See, e.g., Alice G. Abreu, Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, Complex Choices,
33 SAN DEEGo L. REv. 1355 (1996); Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Effi-
ciency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501 (1997);
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Through The Looking Glass with Alice and Larry: the
Nature of Scholarship, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1609 (1998); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. &
Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxa-
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Sacred norms of economic efficiency, neutrality, and even fairness can
(and should) be the subject of critical examination, both in legal and
economic scholarship.6 Recent scholarship has asserted that philo-
sophically and as a matter of Constitutional law, progressive taxation
is impermissible.
One recent article, for example, presents the argument that only a
lump sum head tax (an "absolutely equal" tax) would be fair and con-
sistent with liberal ideals of individual autonomy.7 This unpopular po-
sition is a response to claims about the fairness of various "flat" tax
structures voiced in recent political campaigns. While the lump-sum-
head-tax suggestion is unusual, the assumptions and attitudes on
which it rests are not. Many of the arguments against progressive
taxation seem to rely on attitudes about the poor and assumptions
about the rich that are, at best, discriminatory and that would tend to
be exploitive if put into practice. Political rhetoric surrounding the
tax system often obscures the underlying assumptions and motiva-
tions of the speakers.8 In this essay I examine the often hidden as-
sumptions, attitudes, and philosophical approaches to entitlement to
property that appear to support the claims of the anti-progressivity
movement. 9 Specifically, I consider the notions of entitlement deriv-
ing from the writings of John Locke. The essay responds most partic-
tion, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 1 (1998); Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progres-
sivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REv. 919 (1997); Nancy C. Staudt, The Political
Economy of Taxation: A Critical Review of a Classic, 30 L. & Soc'y Ray. 651
(1996) (reviewing HENRY C. SImoNs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINI-
TION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM IN FIscAL POLICY (1938)); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing
Housework, 84 GEo. L.J. 1571 (1996).
6. See Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 Amiz. L. REv. 739 (1995).
See generally Staudt, supra note 5 (examining the tax theory focus on efficiency
rather than fairness).
7. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 270-71.
8. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An Ex-
ample, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2345 (1996); see also HENRY C. SIMONs, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 1 (1938)
(appearance that fiscal policy is free of "mere ethical considerations" is an empty
pretense); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of
Tax- Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARv. L. Rav. 533, 546 n.49 (1995). ("A critical
evaluation of discourses about welfare and work might also question the social
function of the work ethic and punitive treatment of nonworkers.").
9. Such as it is. Professor Schoenblum asserts that there really is no anti-progres-
sivity movement. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 223 n.12 (noting that
Marjorie Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement:
A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465, 468 (1987), expresses concern
over the increasing attacks on progressivity). Schoenblum states, "[tihis is diffi-
cult to discern in the academic literature, which almost, without exception, un-
critically supports progressivity." Nevertheless, the various "flat" tax proposals of
the last presidential campaign, the move to reintroduce substantial capital gains
preferences, and the appearance of scholarly articles such as Schoenblum's sug-
gest that the opponents of progressivity are more than a few. See also Massey,
supra note 1.
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ularly to Jeffrey Schoenblum's "absolutely equal" (lump sum) tax
proposal because it is the most extreme of the anti-progressive propos-
als. My objections also apply to the milder forms of anti-progressivity,
albeit less starkly.
Some tax scholarship, as well as much of the popular rhetoric, ac-
cepts as given a liberal philosophical approach to the world in which
individuals are supreme and property is, and should be, owned abso-
lutely by individuals.1O In this view, individuals are entitled to all
wealth that is justly acquired." This idea goes back at least to the
seventeenth century and is often attributed to John Locke (unnecessa-
rily, as I argue below). Locke reasoned from the premise that individ-
uals own their own labor,' 2 and that mixing labor with a previously
unowned resource entitles the individual to own the resulting prod-
uet.13 In this way, once upon a time, natural resources originally be-
came subject to private ownership. For Locke, establishing this
natural right to property was a necessary step in establishing a role
for government in protecting property. Locke's theory of why we own
property also sets up a framework within which to analyze the propri-
ety of a government exacting some of that property. In certain ex-
treme versions of the Lockean right to property, to tax land or its
proceeds is to deny an individual some aspect of individual autonomy.
Moreover, when an individual makes an effort to produce that
which society deems valuable, the individual should be entitled to the
resulting accumulation. There are several possible justifications for
this entitlement, some of which we explore below. The significance of
the theory, however, is that different levels of labor mixing result in
differences in wealth.
This approach seems to suggest that voluntary effort is the only
reason (or substantially the main reason) that wealth accumulates
10. See, e.g., RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKmNGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EimsENT Doi IN (1985); Nozici, supra note 1; Schoenblum, supra note 1.
11. In this view, taxation is a kind of attack on private property. See Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the
Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 128-31 (1994).
12. Locke was responding to Sir Robert Filmer, a contemporary who held that kings,
by divine right, had total authority over their subjects. See JOHN LocKE, First
Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GovERNIvIENT § 3, at 160 (Peter Las-
lett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) [hereinafter LocKs, First Treatise];
see also JoHN LocKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF Gov-
ERNIENT, § 22, at 301 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690)
[hereinafter LocKE, Second Treatise] (to the contrary, Locke responded, [t]he
Natural Liberty of Man is to be free from any Superior Power on Earth .... ").
13. See LocE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 27, at 305-06. This argument was to
fly in the face of notions such as divine right, absolutism, and patriarchy. Locke's
predecessors such as Filmer and Hobbes believed that property was derived from
divine authority or patriarchy and that, therefore, no property could exist in the
state of nature.
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and that by virtue of their efforts, people are entitled to their accumu-
lations. While differences in talent and ability also affect accumula-
tion of wealth, we must respect these differences in talent if we respect
people as individuals. Thus, the argument proceeds, differences in tal-
ent and ability are not to be taxed away. Rather, if the market re-
wards an application of talent, respect for the individual means that
we must respect the rewards to the individual's efforts. 14
What are the implications of such a belief system for policy
choices? At the extreme, a strong theory of private property including
entitlement to all returns to labor precludes most taxation.' 5 Under
more moderate versions it precludes progressive taxation and may
even require regressive taxation.' 6
In this essay, I argue that the version of liberal philosophy that
opponents of progressive taxation espouse is not the only possible
modem interpretation of Locke's respect for individual autonomy and,
indeed, is not the best application of Lockean property rights to tax
14. See 1 F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in 1 THE CoL-
LECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK 29, 29-31 (W.W. Bartley DI ed., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1988) (1899) (saying that misguided effort should not be rewarded).
15. A somewhat related argument is that progressive taxation constitutes a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. See Massey, supra note 1. Although usually not
taken seriously, the takings argument has resurfaced in a recent article by Pro-
fessor Calvin Massey. Borrowing from Richard Epstein, Massey argues that the
Takings clause requires that federal taxation satisfy the benefit theory of taxa-
tion, which says simply that taxes should be levied relative to the benefits the
taxpayer receives from the government. Because the benefit theory does not con-
clusively require progressive tax rates, Massey argues, progressive rates must
violate the Takings clause. Massey's analysis of the benefits derived from govern-
ment is incomplete, poorly reasoned, and reveals typical anti-progressivist atti-
tudes about wealth accumulation.
While the lump sum suggestion and the takings suggestion usually do not get
serious attention, the suggestion that only a lump sum tax is consistent with the
philosophical underpinnings of society should be taken very seriously. See gener-
ally Schoenblum, supra note 1. If Professor Schoenblum is correct, we have a real
problem. We ascribe simultaneously to two mutually exclusive theories: First
that all wealth obtained is morally deserved and should not be taken, and second
that it is somehow unfair to expect someone who has landed in unfortunate cir-
cumstances to be able to contribute as much as someone who has experienced
greater financial success.
16. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CH L. REV. 417 (1952), reprinted in WALTER J. BLTuim & HARRY
KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953) (claiming no
need to make a case that progressive taxation is preferable to a regressive tax); cf
Nancy E. Shurtz, A Critical View of Traditional Tax Policy Theory: A Pragmatic
Alternative, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1665, 1689 (1986) (presenting the choice of rate
structure as between proportionate and progressive rates). But see, e.g., Joseph
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look
at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. Rav. 1905, 1907 (1987) (concluding that opti-
mal tax is a progressive one); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To
Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 274 (1983) (asserting that "the case for regressive taxa-
tion is surely wrong" but not citing any presentation of such a case).
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rate discussions. Because I conclude that a philosophical middle
ground is also defensible, I reject the suggestion that the only philo-
sophically honest tax is a lump sum tax. Nevertheless, I applaud
those who raise the question of how we decide what is "fair."
I argue here in favor of a philosophy derived from Lockean individ-
ualism but compatible with "unequal" taxation. I begin by outlining
John Locke's theory of property and consider the possible justifica-
tions for that theory. Next I examine the implications of the theory
and its usefulness for tax rate theory, emphasizing the failings of the
traditional arguments in light of this discussion. Finally, I suggest a
new model of "marginal deservedness of income" based on the justifi-
cations of Locke's theory of property.
II. LOCKE
The purpose of this section is to outline John Locke's theory of enti-
tlement to wealth and to examine two ways of justifying this theory.
One of the main objections to unequal taxes is really an objection to
mandatory redistribution of wealth, which in turn, is based on some
sense of entitlement to that wealth.17 To address the issue of unequal
taxation, then, it makes sense to unpack the underlying theory of enti-
tlement to wealth.
In Book II of his famous Two Treatises on Government,1 8 John
Locke addressed the question of how property came to be privately
owned. He started from the premise that God had given all resources
to all of humanity in common,19 a position that was a rebuttal argu-
ment to another theorist of the time, Sir Robert Filmer.2 0 According
to Filmer, kings had a divine right to claim all property for them-
selves, and consent from the monarch was thus required for appropri-
ation of hitherto unclaimed property.2 1 Filmer's position on property
derived from his belief that monarchs had absolute authority over
17. My colleague Dan Kleinberger points out that the objection could really be lev-
eled at government choices affecting how wealth is redistributed.
18. LocKE, Second Treatise, supra note 12.
19. As this starting point demonstrates, Locke was basically a natural rights theo-
rist. While "natural law" may be somewhat out of vogue these days, "natural"
notions of property seem to underlie much of modern thinking about markets,
fairness, and entitlement to wealth.
20. See LocKE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 1, at 285-86. For a more complete
discussion of the theological aspects of Locke's argument, see John T. Sanders,
Justice and the Initial Acquisition of Property, 10 HARV. J.L. & Pus. Pouy 367,
369-71 (1987).
21. See LocE, First Treatise, supra note 12, § 3, at 160. See generally, e.g., EDwARD
RuTnRFOrU, LONDON (Ballantine Publ'g Group 1998) (1997) (containing a fasci-
nating account of the rise of modern London from its pre-Roman beginnings).
According to Rutherford, "[King James had somehow persuaded himself that
since monarchs were anointed by God, they ruled by Divine Right-which meant
that their subjects must obey them because they could do no wrong." Id. at 708.
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their subjects. Under Locke's view, however, unclaimed resources be-
longed to all of humanity, not to the monarch, and were thus available
to all for the satisfaction of subsistence needs. 22 In addition, un-
claimed resources really were unowned and not commonly owned, so
there was no need to seek permission from the community before ap-
propriating such resources for private use.23 Rather, anyone could ap-
propriate as much of the common abundance as necessary for personal
consumption by simply expending the effort to do so.24
In response to Filmer's claim that monarchs had total authority
over their subjects, Locke argued in favor of a natural freedom. Locke
argued that each individual owns, at a minimum, his or her own la-
bor.2 5 By mixing (personally owned) labor with unclaimed resources,
one could establish private property rights in previously unowned re-
sources and one could appropriate as much as necessary for personal
survival.26 No one was entitled to more than was necessary for sub-
sistence, however, because the excess would spoil before it could be
consumed. Locke saw this waste as a bad thing.27 In addition to the
no-waste limitation, Locke qualified his labor-mixing principle with
the proviso that one must leave "enough and as good" for others.28 For
This belief continued with Charles I who "believed implicitly in his Divine Right."
Id. at 711.
22. LocxE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 25, at 303-04; see also Justin Hughes,
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 288-298 (1988) (outlin-
ing the Lockean property theory with the statement that individuals acquire
goods held in common through a grant from God). God grants the bounty of na-
ture to all of humanity with the requirement that individuals must mix their
labor with the goods before converting them into private property. This labor
thus adds value to the goods.
23. See LocxE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, §§ 27-28, at 305-07.
24. See id. § 31, at 308.
25. See id. §§ 24-26, 31, at 302-05, 308; Geoffirey P. Miller, Comment: Economic Effi-
ciency and the Lockean Proviso, 10 HAxv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 401, 402-03 (1987).
26. See LocxE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 37, at 312 ("Men had a Right to
appropriate, by their Labour, each one to himself, as much of the things of Nature
as he could use .... ).
27. See id. §§ 37-38, 41, at 312-15. But this raises another question: in the pre-mar-
ket state, does Locke see any limit to appropriation other than the fact that some
wealth might go to waste? Is there something inherently morally wrong about
overappropriating if it does not mean too little left for others? In other words,
why should we have cared about waste in the first place if it did not hurt anyone?
See id. § 46, at 318 ("[Ilt was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up
more than he could make use of.").
Indeed, the reason hoarding of gold and silver is acceptable for Locke is that
these metals "may be hoarded up without injury to any one, these metalls [sic]
not spoileing [sic] or decaying in the hands of the possessor." Id. § 50, at 320.
28. This qualification, sometimes referred to as the "Lockean Proviso," has been the
topic of much scholarly attention. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 20, at 373 ("Be-
cause there is a restriction on the whole notion of private property, one that in-
volves the need of others, this restriction must be taken into consideration in the
initial acquisition of property."); see also Hughes, supra note 22, at 297 ("The
[Vol. 78:700
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Locke, the "enough and as good" proviso was not particularly limiting,
since all of America seemed to be a vast source of unclaimed resources
ripe for labor-mixing.2 9 Modem scholars, however, have puzzled
about how to apply the proviso in a world with relative scarcity.3O As
long as there is plenty to go around, there is nothing controversial
about the labor-mixing principle,3 1 but under modern conditions of
relative scarcity, the contours of the labor-mixing theory are less clear.
Markets and money also complicate the applicability of Lockean
labor mixing because money makes accumulation beyond subsistence
possible without spoilage. One might gather extra acorns, for exam-
ple, and trade them for another's extra venison. As long as only per-
ishables are traded, the spoilage restriction remains operable; the
total harvest will be the amount necessary for everyone to subsist.
But if people trade for money, the spoilage limitation loses its force.3 2
By using money, one may appropriate resources beyond immediate
needs and trade the excess for something that doesn't spoil-gold. If
some goods are scarce relative to the demand for them, their owner
will be able to trade the scarce good for more than enough money to
satisfy subsistence needs. The extra accumulation is a reward derived
from the scarcity-driven demand for the product of the gatherer's la-
bor. The use of money in a state of scarcity allows some first appropri-
enough and as good condition protects Locke's labor justification from any attacks
asserting that property introduces immoral inequalities."); Carol M. Rose,
"Enough, and as Good" of What?, 81 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 417, 441 (1987) (discussing
the controversy that lies in the conflicting goals of self-interest and cooperation in
utilizing land to the benefit of all).
29. See LocKE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 41, at 314 ("[Sleveral Nations of the
Americans are of this, who are rich in Land and poor in all the Comforts of Life
... with the materials of Plenty... yet for want of improving it by labour, have
not one hundredth part of the Conveniences we enjoy. .. ").
30. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 20, at 379 (criticizing Locke for his belief that
America rendered questions of scarcity moot). One question this raises in my
mind is why we care what Locke himself thought outside the context of initial
acquisition. See generally, Rose, supra note 28, at 423-25 ("I have a pretty good
idea that old John Locke wouldn't like it either"). In other words why is Locke
God? For purposes of this discussion, however, Locke himself is as good a start-
ing point as any. If the point I am rebutting is that liberal philosophy is funda-
mentally at odds with redistributive taxes, we have to look at some sort of liberal
philosophy. Even more strongly, if Schoenblum calls Locke in as an expert wit-
ness, then Locke's views become relevant. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 266
("[Imndividuals are, in fact, justified in their claims to property derived from their
labor or risk-taking.").
31. See Jeremy Waldron, Book Review, 102 ETmics 401, 403 (1992) (reviewing Ste-
phen Munzer A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990)) ('[T"alk of property makes little
sense except against a background of scarcity .... "). See also Rose, supra note
28, at 424.
32. See LocuI, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 47, at 318-19 ("And thus came in the
use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and that
by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perisha-
ble Supports of Life.").
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ators to accumulate large amounts of wealth not only by appropriating
more than they can use themselves, but also by reaping the rewards of
scarcity-driven demand for the products of their labor.
Locke specifically allowed for excess accumulation in a money econ-
omy, noting that differences in "industry" would result in differences
in the amount of money accumulated.33 But some level of scarcity is
nearly a prerequisite for currency to function.3 4 In Locke's words,
"where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable
to be hoarded up, there Men will not be apt to enlarge their Posses-
sions of Land were it never so rich, never so free for them to take."35
The result is to allow excess accumulation when, by definition, at least
one good is scarce. For Locke, money (a durable, non-spoiling, scarce
good) explains how an individual could "fairly possess more land than
he himself can use the product of." This inequality is fair, only be-
cause the scarce good is money, the accumulation of which harms no
one.3 6 But when something necessary for subsistence becomes scarce,
the theory offers no justification for inequality. So in addition to ques-
tions about how to apply the "enough and as good" proviso, issues can
be raised about how to view greatly unequal accumulations resulting
from market forces, when the underlying property principle is the
Lockean labor-mixing theory, and something needed for survival is
scarce.37 This is exactly the context in which liberal theory matters to
us now, and if we want to discuss the fairness of government taking a
portion of one's accumulation, the first question we have to ask is who
holds what moral claim to the property.
Why exactly should the mixing of labor with a resource establish
ownership? As Justin Hughes has pointed out, the labor-mixing ap-
proach can be viewed in two ways, depending on one's view of human
nature. In both views, economic activity is a positive value that
should be encouraged.38 In the instrumentalist view, labor is unpleas-
ant and people will be induced to perform labor only if they can be
33. See id. at 319 ("And as different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Posses-
sions in different Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them the opportu-
nity to continue and enlarge them.").
34. In theory, markets arise whenever there are advantages to specialization or
when consumer preferences do not match the initial distribution of resources.
From an individual perspective, some resource is scarce and must be purchased
at a negotiated price. When a resource is in abundant supply, however, produ-
cers stop producing or leave the market until the product becomes scarce enough
to bring a price that will sustain the producers. When that relative scarcity is
absent, producers fail, as is now happening in certain agricultural sectors.
35. LocK, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 48, at 319.
36. See id. § 50, at 319-20.
37. See Sanders, supra note 20, at 378 (noting interpretation questions revolving
around "enough and as good").
38. Should this position be challenged? Consider environmental destruction, slavery,
and cultural imperialism as products of the absolute value of economic activity.
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assured of the right to keep the product of the labor.3 9 So one possible
justification for Locke's labor-to-private property result is that the
possibility of accumulating property is an incentive to give up leisure
in favor of labor, and the institution of private property (beyond sub-
sistence needs) is necessary to induce economic activity.40 In the more
extreme versions of this approach, strong property rights are neces-
sary to provide protection against the "limitless self-interest" of free-
loaders.41 Without adequate rewards, economic activity simply would
not be worth the effort.
Market behavior supports the instrumentalist position only to a
point. It is not necessarily true that people work more in response to
higher after-tax wages, for example. Professor Robert Frank notes
that over the last century the average real wage in this country has
increased dramatically. Theoretically, this should have encouraged
people to work more hours. Yet the length of the average workweek is
now shorter than it was at the beginning of the century. 4 2 In the most
recent part of that century, however, median after-tax wages have de-
clined slightly over the last twenty years but the number of hours
worked has been increasing over this period. Rather than responding
to a lack of incentive, people seem to be trying to maintain a constant
level of purchasing power in the face of lower wages.43
Professor Frank theorizes that a far more significant inducement
to increased effort is the extent to which higher relative performance
results in higher rewards. 44 The incentive to perform is the chance of
coming out on top, rather than the promise of greater absolute re-
39. See Hughes, supra note 22, at 288 ('his [Lockean] labor justification can be ex-
pressed either as a normative claim or as a purely incentive-based, instrumental
theory."); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents In the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUm. L. REv. 1667, 1683
(1988) ("In this [Hobbesian] model of human nature, limitless self-interest and
the consequent urgent need for self-defense require the most expansive possible
notion of private property....").
40. See Hughes, supra note 22, at 288-298 (advancing two theories to explain why
property rights should be the reward for mixing labor with land).
41. See Radin, supra note 39, at 1683-84.
42. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION AND THE INCENTIVE PROBLEm 4 (Of-
fice of Tax Policy Research Working Paper Series 98-8, 1998) (citing RONALD E.
EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR EcONOrmucs (1994)); see also
James J. Heckman, What Has Been Learned About Labor Supply in the Past
Twenty Years?, 83(2) Amer. Econ. Rev. 116 (1993); ROBERT A. MOFFITT & MARK
WILHELM, TAXATION AND THE LABOR SUPPLY DECISIONS OF THE AFFLUENT (Na-
tional Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6621, 1998).
43. See FRAN, supra note 42 at 5. This is the income effect in action.
44. See id. at 14 ("[Ilndeed, it is fair to say that virtually all top decile earners in the
U.S. are participants in labor markets in which the rewards depend heavily on
relative performance.").
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wards.45 Thus it is not even clear that as an empirical matter, abso-
lute entitlement to economic rewards is necessary to induce economic
activity.46
The second view of Lockean labor-mixing is that labor is virtuous
and, therefore, deserves reward-a desert theory. This view has a
much more moral overtone and may be reflected in current attitudes
about wealth and virtue.47 There are at least two variations on the
desert theme. One is that labor is virtuous in its own right. Locke
saw the plenitude of the natural world as a divine gift that could only
be enjoyed through the application of labor; God intended that human-
kind prosper by using the abundance provided.48 Thus, in a sense,
labor fulfills divine design by making the riches of the natural world
available. In addition, Locke saw labor itself as divinely com-
manded.49 If labor fulfills some holy design, then it may be seen as
virtuous in its own right and deserving of some reward.50
A second possible desert theory is that labor deserves reward be-
cause private property ultimately provides benefit to society.51
45. Professor Frank develops the concept of relative preferences in his book, CHoos-
ING THE RIGHT POND (1985); see also ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILP J. COOK, THE
WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995); McMahon, Jr. & Abreu, supra note 5.
Comparison of median after tax wages and the number of hours worked is the
conventional approach to measuring labor elasticity. Recent studies suggesting
greater behavioral responses to changes in after-tax rewards have received con-
siderable media attention. Indeed the issue of whether and how behavior
changes in response to changes in after-tax wages has been called "one of the
liveliest areas of debate of the last twenty years in public economics." AUSTAN
GOOLSBEE, IT's NOT ABouT THE MONEY: WHY NATURAL EXPERIMENTS DON'T WORK
ON THE RICH (American Bar Found. Working Paper No. 9716, 1998).
46. Some entitlement to reward is necessary to the extent that money functions as
the "grades that grown-ups get." If money represents levels of prestige, then the
existence of any difference in reward is more important than the magnitude of
that difference. (Thanks to Dan Kleinberger for this analogy).
47. See Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 131 (stating that Americans are impelled to
save money as a result of moral and economic virtues in order to help oneself and
society); see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income
Tax, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 607, 614 (1996) (defining the principle of desert as
when an individual "deserves" or merits the distribution because of some per-
sonal characteristic such as ability, effort, or talent).
48. LOCKE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 31, at 308 ("God has given us all things
richly." (quoting I Timothy 6:17)).
49. Id. at § 32, at 308 ("God, when he gave the World in common to all Mankind,
commanded Man also to labour, and the penury of his Condition required it of
him."); see also Marjorie Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 125 (noting that American
ideas about wealth and money stem partly from the notion of service to God
through a vocation).
50. See Waldron, supra note 31, at 402 (stating that some account is needed of why
productive labor is meritorious).
51. See Hughes, supra note 22, at 305 ("[W]hen labor produces something of value to
others-something beyond what morality requires the laborer to produce-then
the laborer deserves some benefit for it.").
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Wealth is evidence of society's gratitude for value created. For Locke,
uncultivated, non-productive land was practically worthless. Working
the land added value in the form of produce which could be used for
subsistence or for trade, ultimately to provide subsistence for others.52
Even excess accumulation is beneficial in this view because it creates
potential value for the rest of society. 53 In the case of land, productive
use of privately owned land means that goods become available for
purchase. Some theorists have interpreted the "enough and as good"
proviso as applying to the market as a whole so that making goods
available for purchase is somewhat analogous to leaving "enough and
as good."54 In addition, because labor is necessary for land to be pro-
ductive, bringing land into productive use creates yet more demand
for the labor of others.5 5
Thus, desert may also result from the value that those with high
incomes have contributed to society.5 6 The notion is related to Pareto
optimality, the economics principle that suggests that a voluntary
trade will only take place if both parties are as well or better off after
the trade than they were before. In a voluntary trade, the two things
traded have relatively equal value, since neither side would willingly
pay more than the value of the good or service being received. 57 The
52. See LocKE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 43, at 316 ("'is Labor then which
puts the greatest part of Value upon Land, without which it would scarcely be
worth any thing.").
53. "Thus the Lockean proviso is not violated if someone takes land out of the com-
mons in excess of his or her pro rata share, so long as the benefits to others re-
sulting from the excess land being placed in productive use exceed the value of
the excess land which is taken." Geoffrey P. Miller, Economic Efficiency and the
Lockean Proviso, 10 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 401, 407 (1987); see also Hughes,
supra note 22, at 305 (stating that labor-desert theory provides reward for labor
because labor creates social value); cf. Sanders, supra note 20, at 393 (arguing
that society should not prohibit labor that does not provide benefit to the
community).
54. LocKE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 40, at 314 ("[C]onsider, what the differ-
ence is between an Acre of Land planted.., and an Acre of the same Land lying
in common, without any Husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improve-
ment of labour makes the far greater part of the value"). So, for example, even if
one country were to scoop up all the ocean floor manganese nodules, this would be
far better than leaving this "common heritage" of mankind on the ocean floor. See
Arvid Pardo, An Opportunity Lost, in LAw OF HE SA U.S. PoLcy DmEmm_ 23
(Bernard H. Oxman et al. eds., 1983).
55. This is somewhat problematic. Under the labor-mixing theory, labor that makes
land productive should result in ownership of the land or at least its produce.
56. See Barbara Fried, Wilt Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick's 'Justice in Transfer"
and the Problem of Marhet Based Distribution, 24 PHI. & PuB. AFF. 226, 245
n.39 (listing possible arguments for property rights in economic rents).
57. This assumption is reflected in the tax definition of fair market value: 'The fair
market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or
to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." 26 C.F.R.
§ 20.2031-1(b).
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seller, then, is seen as providing value to the buyer, the extent of
which value is measured by the amount the buyer is willing to pay.
Accordingly, we can be confident that high incomes simply reflect the
value that their recipients have contributed; the evidence is that
others voluntarily paid the sums involved in return. In other words,
one could argue that an individual is entitled to the marginal product
of his or her labor.58
There are two fundamental problems with this form of desert argu-
ment. First, the fact that something has market value need not imply
that providing it should create an entitlement to wealth in any moral
sense. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a mismatch between
what people deem to be important and what is highly compensated.
For example, most parents would rate their children and their obliga-
tions to their children as of very high importance. But daycare work-
ers command relatively low salaries. Similarly, the teachers who are
entrusted with the education of the next generation of leaders and citi-
zens receive only moderate salaries at best, notwithstanding the im-
portance to society of the function they perform. Recent challenges to
the quality of public school education notwithstanding, it is hard to
argue that these jobs do not add considerable value to society. But
this "value," apparently, is not something the market rewards. On the
other hand, many people despise lawyers because they are seen as
contributing to the unnecessary complexity of the law and as inducing
people to be more adversarial and litigious. Yet lawyers are often very
highly paid. Do lawyers create value in the same way that teachers
create value? Some kinds of value do not translate well into market
terms.5 9
Second, to the extent that markets are incomplete or imperfect, the
price something reflects in the market may not be the equilibrium
price that would result in perfect competition, but may represent some
level of monopoly rent. How can value conferred on society, as mea-
sured by income, accurately determine desert when the producer or
seller has monopoly power? This is a problem of scarcity. A scarce
good commands a high price because consumers who value the good
very highly will outbid other consumers for the limited quantities
58. See Fried, supra note 56, at 245 n.39 (defending individual entitlements to her
marginal product of labor on Lockean and Hayekian grounds).
59. Those differences in pay may not trouble us from an instrumentalist perspective
when we consider the intangible, psychic benefits of teaching that may be lacking
in the practice of law such that the net utility of the one job is not so different
from that of the other. From a desert perspective, however, focusing on the net
benefit to the teacher is improper; our focus now is the benefit conferred on
society.
In some cases, market values may reflect historical attitudes and values. For
example, teachers and nurses may be undercompensated because these positions
have typically been held by women.
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available. Potential consumers who are outbid presumably do not
value the good as highly as the successful bidders. But this analysis
assumes that the only relevant question in determining price is will-
ingness to pay. Ability to pay is simply assumed (or disregarded). It
may be that poor individuals would derive even greater utility from
the good if they had the means to purchase it. A concept of value that
assumes across-the-board ability to pay, then, seems to be an inaccu-
rate way of determining the moral brownie points that should accrue
to provision of goods or services in an imperfect market. In addition,
the market model only registers improvements in utility for the direct
participants. The preferences of non-participants are ignored.
Thus the definition of value as it applies to economic market mod-
els is inadequate in describing desert. By definition, the market value
of a good is the amount people are willing and able to pay. That defi-
nition of value may be fine for analyzing market incentives. But if our
theory is that a seller is morally entitled to all of the proceeds from a
sale because the seller has contributed value to society, a different un-
derstanding might be more appropriate. A utility-based concept of
value, for all of its difficulty of measurement, might be more appropri-
ate to a theory of desert than a value theory that is limited by ability
to pay. Development of such a desert theory, however, is beyond the
scope of this essay since it shifts the focus from the individual provid-
ing goods and services, whose autonomy we wish to respect, to a focus
on those individuals acquiring the goods and services. A utility-based
theory would require assumptions about the utility of goods and serv-
ices to various purchasers independent of the price actually paid. The
focus here, however, is whether the provider of the good/service is
morally entitled to it.
We usually speak of income as if there were a direct correlation
between income and effort-more effort means more income, and high
income implies high effort. We would have a much more accurate pic-
ture if we recognized that a part of most incomes derives not directly
from effort, but from luck, inheritance, or some other type of serendip-
ity. Since both the desert theory and the instrumentalist theory of
labor-mixing derive entitlement to wealth from the combination of la-
bor (effort) and an unowned resource, neither form of the labor-mixing
theory adequately explains our apparent belief in equal moral entitle-
ment to all income.
Under either a desert or instrumentalist theory of labor-mixing
(where desert is tied to the labor itself rather than to the market soci-
ety's response to the product), it is possible to make a distinction be-
tween that part of the market returns that truly rewards an
individual's efforts and that part of the returns that rewards luck, in-
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heritance, or scarcity. 60 Yet this is a distinction that usually is not
made. Indeed, the level of effort almost seems irrelevant.61
It seems clear that Locke had a high regard for individual effort as
well as for individual autonomy, and to a large extent, effort is still a
factor in desert.62 Indeed, a frequent argument against redistribution
of income is that someone who worked hard should not be penalized
merely to benefit one who chose leisure over work.63 Moreover, recent
empirical studies show that people feel the most morally entitled to
wealth they earn through personal efforts.64 But even though on a
conscious level we seem to believe that effort should matter,65 as a
society we do not reward effort. Rather, effort or exertion only appears
to be the justification for accumulation of private property. Actually,
the level of effort or exertion seems to be of minor significance when
compared to the effectiveness of the effort. Actual achievement,
rather than the labor that went into it determines desert to a greater
extent than does effort.
The conclusion that effort matters little and outcome matters a lot
is somewhat consistent with the basic Lockean labor-mixing theory. If
a resource is unowned, then even a small amount of personal effort
60. This concept of value has been called the "social increment theory of valuation."
See John J. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Deci-
sion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 402, 415-416 (1977).
61. In some cases, even a value-added formula may be difficult to identify. For exam-
ple, in 1996 the CEO of Green Tree Financial reportedly earned $102 million.
Under a revised formula, he would have earned a meager $7 million plus stock
options, according to the St. Paul Pioneer Press. See D.J. Tice, What's the Answer
on Skyrocketing CEO Pay?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 23, 1997, at 6A.
62. See David Miller, Distributive Justice: What the People Think, 102 ETmcs 555,
562 (1992) (explaining that in studies where people judge an appropriate reward
depending upon achievement, the notion of effort is also important because "it is
possible for a person who achieves less but tries harder to deserve more than
another who tries less but achieves more.").
63. See Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 139 (noting that income tax has been de-
nounced as "rewarding the idle and the wastrel"); see also Elizabeth Hoffman &
Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Exami-
nation of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEAL STUD. 259, 273
(1985) (describing broad theories of distributive justice and empirically testing
behavioral responses against these theories). Professors Hoffman and Spitzer
showed that in an experimental setting, people behave as if effort is the most
important factor in deciding how rewards should be distributed among partici-
pants. See id. at 266.
64. See Miller, supra note 62, at 562 (explaining that "effort does not obliterate
achievement: with effort held constant, the one who achieves more deserves
more, so presumably the view is that ability can count toward desert when it is
combined with effort but not when it stands alone").
65. This is one of the arguments against high compensation for corporate executives.
See Tice, supra note 61 ("People try to believe that skill, hard work and a decision
to focus on monetary rewards (plus luck, usually) largely explain why some
Americans are richer than others. Corporate America can't afford executive pay
so extravagant and seemingly exploitive that it destroys this fragile confidence.").
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will convert the resource to private property simply by establishing a
right in the property that is stronger than any other right. One who is
able to gather a lot of acorns with little effort is just as entitled to
them as is someone who expends a lot of effort.66 In the face of plenty,
a lot of ineffective effort brings no greater reward than a little effective
effort.67 The effectiveness principle is even clearer, however, in a
money economy. The use of money, as we noted above allows appro-
priation of scarce resources beyond an individual's personal needs.
Scarcity creates demand at a relatively higher price, allowing even
greater accumulation of wealth. So as a theoretical matter, Lockean
regard for individuals results in rewarding effort, but in practice
something else must be going on.
As noted above, money effects a fundamental change in the appli-
cation of the labor-mixing theory because money does not spoil. The
result is "disproportionate and unequal possession of the Earth."6s
Differences in "industry" result in unequal appropriations, and these
differences can then be enlarged in the marketplace. The resulting
distribution is unequal partly because of differences in effort but even
more so because of differences in the market demand for different
goods. In other words, wealth accumulates as a result of effort that is
effective in producing market value. Ineffective effort, no matter how
earnest, is simply not rewarded. Property ownership, then, is the re-
ward of individual effort, to be sure, but it is greatly affected by the
workings of the market as well. So what was forbidden in a state of
abundance-appropriation beyond immediate needs-is perfectly ac-
ceptable and even rewarded in a money-driven market economy.
III. SOCIAL INCREMENT APPROACH
As we have seen, a Lockean-derived respect for the autonomy of
the individual does establish the appropriateness of some disparity of
wealth or income. But it does not account for all of the disparity. Part
of the disparity results from societal factors for which the individual is
not responsible. To backstep just a bit, I have described how Locke's
theory of property derives from individuals' ownership of their own
labor. But how much property must necessarily be the reward for la-
bor? Neither the instrumentalist nor the desert theory provides a
clear answer. Under a desert theory-that property is a reward for
66. Consider Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805),
which held that a dead fox belongs to the hunter who shot it, not to hunter who
chased it all day and cornered it. The only labor that counts for anything is the
labor that actually brings down the fox.
67. See Sanders, supra note 20, at 393 (arguing that not all labor is "successfully"
invested, but that this is irrelevant to the labor-mixing criterion from a justice
perspective).
68. LocKE, Second Treatise, supra note 12, § 50, at 319-20.
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virtue or a sign of virtue-if the virtue being rewarded is effort, wealth
only needs to be proportionate to effort.69 In fact, wealth is often (if
not usually) vastly disproportional to effort. Thus, if effort is the vir-
tue to be rewarded, a lot of wealth is not morally deserved, but is a
windfall. Under the instrumentalist theory-that material reward is
necessary to induce effort-only the material effort necessary to in-
duce effort is justified. In fact, other factors also induce effort, and
material compensation is likely to rise far beyond the level necessary
to assure continued effort. These claims deserve closer examination.
IV. DESERT THEORY
If effort is the virtue to be rewarded, a lot of wealth is not morally
deserved. But we have said that we do not reward the virtue of effort
so much as the virtue of efficacy.70 Does the fact that we do reward
efficacy mean that we respect it as a virtue? We also reward luck.
Studies have shown that people regard effort as more virtuous and
deserving of reward than luck. For example, in one study, subjects in
one group were asked to play a short game that appears to require
skill, but actually requires very little, the outcome generally depend-
ing on who gets to go first.71 The winner of the game becomes the
"controller" for a decision regarding how much money each player will
be paid. Another set of subjects also had to make a decision regarding
distribution of money, but the controller was chosen by coin toss.
When the subject "earned" the right to be controller by winning the
game, the distribution of money chosen was much more likely to be
69. But, the reader argues, not all effort is equal. Some effort amounts to just going
through the motions, not real effort. Of course it is possible that some people
would muck along making only half-hearted effort. A system that rewarded
quantifiable effort rather than outcome would certainly have some free riders.
The current system of rewarding outcome has the same effect, however, along
with the failure to reward a lot of honest hard effort that produces little or that is
abundantly available. If desert accrued to effort, everyone would at least have to
go through the motions. The market could enforce the integrity of the effort.
Those who did not really exert would find themselves without the opportunity to
make an effort at all. In theory, this is already true. The problem is that we
seem to assume that lack of effort is the only factor.
70. See Rose, supra note 28, at 437 (original appropriators seen to deserve reward
"because they do a public service by starting a property system that encourages
investment and care in the use of resources"); John Stick, Renegotiating a RUM
Deal, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 443, 448 (1987) (stating that rational utility maximizer
suggests that only property owners are productive members of society).
71. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 63, at 268-69, 273. The game was very simple.
Two players are shown a series of 17 vertical hash marks, which they must take
turns crossing off. Each player in turn crosses off 1, 2, 3, or 4 hash marks. The
person who crosses out the last hash mark loses the game. (Go ahead, try it.
Great stuff for faculty meetings.)
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disproportionate in favor of the controller. When the controller was
chosen by coin toss, however, the distribution of proceeds was more
even, the principle apparently being that effort and ability create de-
sert but luck does not.72
How could it be then, that we would regard the lucky investor as
more virtuous than the wage laborer? On its face, the question seems
absurd, but higher incomes are likely to include investment income,
while lower incomes are more likely to consist solely of wages. If high
income is somehow a sign of virtue, then the lucky investor exhibits
more evidence of virtue than the wage laborer. The failure to make a
distinction between effort and outcome leads us to treat efficacy as a
surrogate for effort,73 and in our confusion, we assume that the
greater output required the greater input. Opponents of progressive
taxation often invoke images of idle poor and industrious wealthy peo-
ple to support arguments against redistributive taxes. 74 But where
Locke's theory starts with effort (labor) to explain an entitlement to
wealth, our approach is backwards and circular. We take the exist-
ence of wealth and assume it all resulted from effort (labor) and then
rely on that very effort to establish entitlement to wealth, an entitle-
ment that resists taxation. Locke's theory does not explain an entitle-
ment to all wealth, but only to that wealth that results from effort
(labor). We add a first step of converting all wealth into the result of
effort.
V. INSTRUMENTALIST THEORY
Material compensation often exceeds the amount needed to induce
effort. Under an instrumentalist approach to wealth the analysis is
similarly inadequate. The instrumentalist rationale, again, is that
the effective effort must be rewarded to induce people to engage in
more productive effort. Yet this rationale for property does a poor job
of justifying rewards that are disproportionate to effort. If the role of
property is to encourage effort, then one should be entitled to as much
property as is necessary to induce the desired effort, but not more. Yet
when reward is based on efficacy of effort75-efficacy in terms of pro-
72. See id. at 282-283 (noting that subjects regarded position of controller as justified
right after playing the hash mark game).
73. See Thomas Ross, Taking Takings Seriously, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1591, 1601 (1986)
(describing Epstein's argument that "providing welfare increases the number of
people who will forego productive lives and choose to be supported by society" as
at best "perfunctory and lethargic").
74. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 261 (presenting a situation where a person
worked her way up from poverty to be a successful medical doctor while her old
friends can now barely get by because of their "lack of willpower and
determination).
75. See Hoffinan & Spitzer, supra note 63, at 273. ("Lockean theory.., has room
within it for differences in efficacy of effort: even if two people spend the same
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viding something that the market is willing to pay for-rather than
the level of exertion, 76 the reward may go beyond that needed incen-
tive. Individual levels of effort, like individual utility curves, 77 cannot
be quantified. It is easy, however, to measure the amount that society
is willing to pay for the results of that effort. It is only when the
amount of a good or service is directly tied to the time spent providing
it that we make any clear attempt to reward the effort itself. So
hourly workers earn more if they work forty hours a week than if they
work thirty. The hourly rate, itself, however, has little to do with the
amount of effort involved in the task.78 Rather, it is a measure of the
"value" placed on the product of the labor, and only a very small por-
tion of that value is tied to the actual effort expended. 79
VI. THE REST OF THE STORY-THE SOCIAL INCREMENT
OF VALUE
There is room within Lockean property theory for a distinction be-
tween wealth that is the fair reward for engaging in productive labor
and wealth that is the result of luck.80 Locke's theory really only re-
amount of time or try as hard, the person who does a better job still deserves the
resource.").
76. For a more vernacular statement of this principle, see Rosina B. Barker and Jas-
per L. Cummings, Jr., Interview With Thomas F. Field, 15 ABA SEC. OF TAX!N
NEWSL. 13 (Summer 1996). Thomas Field, the founder of Tax Analysts, a major
tax information publisher describes his start in tax publishing as "an illustration
of the old adage, 'better lucky than smart'.... And step-by-step, little by little,
very much to our surprise, we have found ourselves to be a factor in tax publish-
ing. It is all an accident." Id. at 13-14.
77. The inability to make satisfactory comparisons of utility functions among individ-
uals has long confounded the declining marginal utility of income theory. But see
Mark S. Stein, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income and Progressive Taxation:
A Critique of the Uneasy Case, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 373, 374 (1992) (defending
the concept of declining marginal utility of income).
78. Jennifer Hochschild interviewed people to determine their attitudes about in-
come distribution and desert. She concluded that people believe that factors
within the workers' control, such as effort, should create desert, but that they also
believe that actual achievement should create desert. For example, a lazy janitor
should receive less than a hardworking one, but even a lazy doctor should receive
more than either. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR: AMERiCAN BELIEFS
ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 112 (1981), cited in Miller, supra note 62 (reviewing
works in political theory on social or distributive justice and empirical studies of
attitudes about distributive justice).
79. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAxATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 20 (1938) (noting the effect of market demand on
wages over and above the amount of wages necessary to induce performance of
services: "What competing firms must pay to get experts away from one another
is vastly different from what society would be obliged to pay in order to keep the
experts from being ditch-diggers").
80. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 63, at 273; Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal
Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1685 (1988) (stating that commitment to individual secur-
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quires the conclusion that individuals are entitled to some return for
their own labor or for the unpleasantness of having worked.81 To the
extent that wealth accumulation results not from labor, but from luck,
inheritance,8 2 or heredity, an individual's moral claim to that wealth
is much weaker. Society, itself, may also have a role in the production
of wealth even if only through the facilitation of markets that allow
the trading that produces unequal accumulations of wealth.
Professor Barbara Fried makes this point with respect to natural
talent, which can be seen as the result of pure luck.8 3 If one mixes
labor with that natural talent, the labor deserves to be rewarded, but
because labor per se is not in short supply, the market price repre-
sents more than fair compensation for the labor. The part of the mar-
ket price that exceeds the fair return to labor is more like monopoly
rent84 -- the price is high not because of any virtue of the talented
worker, but because there is more demand for the talent than there is
supply of it.85 Fried notes that there is an argument that society,
which has supplied the demand for the talent, has just as good a claim
on the surplus value generated by talent as does the athlete who sim-
ply has the good fortune to be born with that talent.86 No amount of
innate talent would have value if it did not match the preferences of
some market segment.
Intellectual property offers another example that supports this
point. Intellectual property scholars make a distinction between an
idea and its expression.8 7 There is no market for ideas without ex-
pression, just as there is no market for talent without effort and no
ity "moral as basis for property supports conservative and progressive concep-
tions of property"); Ross, supra note 73, at 1594 (stating that Locke's theory is
consistent with redistribution).
81. See also Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REv.
961, 1008 (1992) (extending Lockean theory to the act of saving because of the
sacrifice involved).
82. Inheritance raises interesting cross-generational issues. Part of the incentive for
parents to work may be to leave a legacy for their children, and that legacy
should be treated as part of the parent's desert. But when we consider the child's
income derived from that inherited wealth, it is appropriate to focus on the child's
efforts rather than the parent's. Thus inherited wealth provides an income
stream for which an individual does not labor.
83. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59
U. Cm. L. Rxv. 225, 251 (1992).
84. See DAvm N. HyatAN, EcoNoMIcs 386-87 (3d ed. 1994).
85. See id.
86. See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a
Consumption Tax, 86 GEo. L.J. 539, 545-46 (1998).
87. See CurRs C. BERGER & JOAN C. WIAuMS, PROPERTY, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE
77-85 (4th ed. 1997); Justin Hughes, supra note 22, at 310. Professor Hughes
notes, however, that courts have never developed a clear distinction between idea
and expression, but goes on to develop the idea at least on a conceptual level. See
id. at 312-13.
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market for unappropriated natural resources. It makes sense that
there should be no market for unexpressed talent and ideas. From an
instrumentalist perspective, no amount of incentive can induce talent
to appear where it does not exist, and to a certain extent, incentives
cannot create "aha" experiences.8 8 Although "aha" experiences may
follow extensive research and thought, they are often serendipitous.
Once an idea is expressed, however, it becomes owned because of
the expression. Thus it is only the effort involved in expressing the
idea that creates entitlement to the idea and its proceeds.8 9 Accord-
ingly, that effort should be rewarded either to encourage more of it, or
as a reward for having made a valuable product available. 90 But the
price the market places on the expressed idea often reflects much
more than the effort that went into expressing the idea. The market
price also reflects society's response to the idea.9 1 Thus it is the inter-
action between society and the fortunate talented individual that re-
sults in accumulation of wealth.
Similarly, actions of government in the public interest may result
in private profit. For example, when a transportation authority plans
rail routes to converge on a single train station, the owners of that
station reap a windfall in higher rents. In the celebrated landmark
preservation case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York,92 Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court, acknowl-
edged the contributions of society and government to the value of the
Grand Central Station property in New York City. The state court
opinion9 3 relied on this reasoning to an even greater extent. The New
York Court of Appeals asserted that "society as an organized entity
especially through its government, rather than as a mere conglomer-
88. A recent issue of DISCOVER magazine highlighted the role of creativity in scien-
tific advancement. One article focused specifically on discoveries that are made
completely by accident.
For example, Teflon was the result of an accidental polymerization of te-
trafluoroethylene ('TFE") that was being stored in preparation for an unrelated
experiment. See Robert Friedel, The Accidental Inventor: Some Inventions Result
from Unexpected Consequences, DISCOVER, Oct. 1, 1996, at 58; see also Hughes,
supra note 22, at 303 (explaining the instrumental argument for property that
labor should be rewarded because people must be motivated to perform labor).
89. This discussion should not be interpreted to mean that there is little or no effort
involved in expression. The effort can be considerable, as anyone who has written
a law review article is well aware.
90. See Hughes, supra note 22, at 305.
91. Teflon, discovered quite by accident, was a valuable discovery because of its possi-
ble military and industrial uses. Scientists needed something that would resist
the corrosive action of uranium hexafluoride that served as fuel for the atomic
bomb in World War II. See Friedel, supra note 88.
In addition, patent protection may also allow the inventor to enjoy monopoly
rent for the duration of the patent.
92. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
93. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977).
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ate of individuals, has created much of the value of the terminal prop-
erty."94 Accordingly, the value that would require compensation in a
takings case was something less than the full fair market value of the
property. "A fair return is to be accorded the owner, but society is to
receive its due for its share in the making of a once great railroad."95
It is thus possible to embrace a Lockean respect for individuals
that rewards effort yet simultaneously to recognize a role for society in
the production of wealth. Although some libertarian scholars would
argue that personal freedom means we are entitled to all of the value
that is generated by our own labor mixing,9 6 it is difficult to see why
we should be entitled to whatever the market will pay.9 7 Because en-
titlement to wealth is justifiable only to varying extents even in a
Lockean sense, it is not particularly surprising that American society
embraces and has embraced seemingly conflicting attitudes about
wealth.98 In her article, The Morality of Money, Professor Maijorie
Kornhauser traces American attitudes about wealth and its distribu-
tion.9 9 She identifies a tension between a view that saving is more
moral than spending so that unearned income somehow indicates de-
servedness and a view that labor is virtuous so that earned income is
morally superior.OO In addition, we hold competing views of the indi-
vidual: we "extol individualism and the sacred right to property," but
at the same time our regard for individuals leads to emphasis on
equality.l 0 l
What does this have to do with tax rates? If the argument is that
progressive rates are unfair because high income folks are entitled to
their high incomes, then an argument that challenges the claim of en-
titlement may also help to establish the fairness of progressive (or at
any rate "unequal") taxes. For example, in 1942, Congress enacted
significant tax legislation. One of the debated issues was the appro-
priate rate of corporate income taxation. There was incentive to raise
corporate taxes because corporations had become very profitable as a
result of the war. Reported net corporate income had increased 146%
94. Id at 332.
95. Id. at 333; see also Costonis, supra note 60, at 416 (defining social increment of
value as "the portion of a property's value that is attributable to public invest-
ment and concomitant community growth").
96. See generally Nozicx, supra note 1; Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 39-40.
97. See Fried, supra note 56, at 228.
98. See generally Kornhauser, supra note 11.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 120. Professor Kornhauser develops the roles of these attitudes in deter-
mining tax policy through the history of the U.S. income tax. See also A.EXJs DE
TocQuEvILLu, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Steele Commager ed., Henry Reeve
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1959) (pt. 1, 1835 & pt. 2, 1840) (asserting that these
two views are antipathetic).
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from 1939 to 1942, for example.i0 2 Senator La Follette testified that
"these increased incomes can be considered as direct consequences of
Government expenditures arising out of the national emergency" and
concluded that it was not unjust for the government to "recover the
additional net income."' 0 3 At that time corporations were subject to a
"normal" income tax, a surtax, and an excess profits tax.i0 4 The
Treasury proposed a combined normal and surtax rate of 55%, which
would have soaked up most of the additional profits.1 0 5 The rationale
behind the surtax was thus explicit recognition of the role of society as
a whole in producing high incomes.
A similar concept appears in respect to the valuation of mobile
homes. When mobile home sites are scarce, the market value of a mo-
bile home in a park is much higher than the value of one not in a park.
Karl Manheim discusses the concept of "placement value" and notes
that courts have recognized this separate component of value but have
disagreed about how to allocate it.106 Certainly there are those who
would argue that the "placement value" belongs clearly and only to the
park owner, 1 0 7 but the scarcity of mobile home sites is often as much a
result of very restrictive zoning laws that create virtual monopolies for
the few mobile home parks allowed as it is a result of the landlord's
foresight in choosing a good location.' 0 Thus at least one court has
found that legislation allocating the benefit of that placement value to
the tenant does not violate any constitutional principles. No value has
been taken from the landlord. Rather that value which the state has
created, the state has now allocated.1 0 9
Barbara Fried has also described the ways in which a mere exist-
ence of government affects returns to investors. Increasing the money
supply, for example, has an effect on interest rates, which in turn af-
fects investors."10 To the extent the effect is a positive one, govern-
ment or society can be seen as playing a role in determining the
102. See ROBERT M. FOLLETrE, JR., INDrvmuAL VIEws, S. REP. No. 77-131, pt. 2, at 6-7
(1942), reprinted in 108 U.S. R rmEuE AcTS 1909-1950: THE LAws, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND AD mmSTRATIVE DocUmENTs (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
103. Id. at 7.
104. See id. at 8.
105. See id. at 7.
106. See Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 Wis.
L. Rav. 925, 964.
107. See Werner Hirsch & Joel Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a
Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 399, 446-47 (1988) (characterizing "placement value" as merely a product of
the landlord's right to set rents).
108. See Manheim, supra note 106, at 965.
109. See id. at 965 n.225 (discussing Eamiello v. Liberty Home Sales, 546 A.2d 805,
820 (Conn. 1988)).
110. See Fried, supra note 81, at 1007-1008.
[Vol. 78:700
1999] LOCKE, PROPERTY, AND PROGRESSIVE TAXES 723
rewards to investment activity.1 1 ' This effect also serves to highlight
the larger point that differences in rewards result from many factors
other than differences in "industry."11 2
Finally, Ronald Dworkin has also identified market-generated re-
turns that result from luck or inheritance, as opposed to effort.ii3
Dworkin does not suggest that differences in effort would not generate
differences in accumulation. Rather, he begins by describing the dif-
ferences in accumulation that would quickly appear even in a closed
economy where everyone starts out with the same level of ability and
resources.1 1 4 Differences in ambition and willingness to take risks re-
sult in differences in accumulation, but these differences are accepta-
ble because they result purely from individual choice; everyone could
accumulate as much as the person who accumulates the most, if they
were willing to expend the effort or make the same sacrifices."i 5 But
when the inability to accumulate is due to "brute bad luck," Dworkin
proposes a taxing scheme that would account for differences in income
due to factors other than effort.li6
VII. APPLICATION TO TAX POLICY
Fundamental disagreements are likely to stem from underlying at-
titudes and assumptions, which usually are not the focus of debate.' 17
But underlying attitudes should be the focus."i 8 Opponents of pro-
gressive taxation argue that the usual theories of progressivity do not
111. See generally Duncan Kennedy & Frank MAichelman, Are Property and Contract
Efficient?, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980) (arguing that any social structure "dis-
torts" incentives relative to desert island economy).
112. This also is not quite the same as the more direct effects usually identified as
"benefits" for purposes of the benefit theory, although advocates of progressivity
do cite some indirect effects such as the availability of an educated labor force as
factors in successful accumulation of wealth. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 9,
at 484-85.
113. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,
10 PHmi. & PuB. AFF. 283 (1981). I have discussed Dworkin's Equality of Re-
sources theory in greater detail elsewhere. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 778-782.
114. See Dworkin, supra note 113.
115. See id. at 292-93, 306; see also Byrne, supra note 6, at 778-79.
116. Dworkin, supra note 113, at 320-22. Dworkin sets forth a hypothetical model of
social "underemployment" insurance whereby a person would be compensated in
relation to the amount of insurance they would have bought had they not known
what type of natural abilities they would possess. People would find it worth
their while to buy at least the minimum amount necessary to ensure that they
did not end up at the bottom of the employment ladder given the marginal utility
of the policy. See also Byrne, supra note 6, at 778-779.
117. See my earlier article in which I presented in some detail the philosophical issues
which inform the rate structure discussions. See generally Byrne, supra note 6.
118. Marjorie Kornhauser has made this argument in her articles on Tax Reform
Rhetoric. See Kornhauser, supra note 9; Kornhauser, supra note 8; Kornhauser,
supra note 47; see also Byrne, supra note 6; Schoenblum, supra note 1.
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prove the fairness of redistributive taxes and that high income earn-
ers thus "have an especially compelling claim that there is no justice
in being taxed more harshly than other taxpayers who do not earn as
much.""i9 Accordingly, there can be no ethical quality to differenti-
ated rates of taxation; mere preferences for redistribution on equalita-
rian grounds are simply at odds with the value of individual
autonomy.' 20 In this section, I argue that a preference for individual
autonomy as a normative value does not preclude redistributive
taxes 12 1 and respond to arguments to the contrary.122
A. Why Taxes Don't Interfere with the Instrumentalist
Version of Lockean Respect for Individual
Autonomy
Under the instrumentalist version of Lockean theory discussed
above, the reason for allowing an individual to reap the rewards of
effort is to provide an incentive for that effort. If enough incentive is
left in place after taxation, the effort should still occur under this the-
ory. Taxing the product of labor, however, reduces the incentive to
engage in productive labor, at least in theory.' 2 3 Thus taxes, which
119. Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 224.
120. I use the term "redistributive" loosely here to mean taxes that result in a transfer
of benefit from the wealthy to the poor. A tax could also redistribute from the
poor to the wealthy. For example, the absolutely equal tax that Schoenblum ad-
vocates could also be a redistributive tax if it is true, as benefit theory proponents
suggest, that better-off people derive greater benefits from government than
those less well off. If it is true at all that the wealthy benefit more (regardless of
whether or not that disparity supports progressivity), then a lump sum tax would
mean that poor folks, through their equal contributions, are paying for benefits
that go only to the wealthy. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 249. For purposes
of the discussion in this section, however, I will go along with the usual character-
ization of income taxes as redistributive in the sense of redistributive from high
income to low income.
121. Schoenblum's proposal is not a pure head tax. He allows for a zero tax bracket
and a phase-in range. Thus, under his proposal the poorest of the poor would not
support the wealthy, although the fairly poor would. See Schoenblum, supra note
1, at 270.
122. In particular, Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum has argued that the only tax that is
fair to all individuals is an "absolutely equal" tax-a lump sum head tax. See
Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 271 (emphasizing that even if "equal" taxation is
unattainable, it should serve as a standard by which tax models are evaluated for
their fairness).
123. The extent to which this is true depends on the elasticity of labor. Studies have
shown that the supply of labor provided by primary wage earners is inelastic with
respect to income (and therefore taxes). See Jane G. Gravelle, Behavioral Re-
sponses to Proposed High-income Tax Rate Increases: An Evaluation of the Feld-
stein-Feenberg Study, 59 TAx NoTEs 1097, 1100 (May 24, 1993) (claiming that
most studies find that labor supply elasticity for males is negative and small).
There are several possible reasons for this phenomenon. First, upper income
workers may work for reasons other than incremental salary increases. Non-
monetary considerations such as prestige and a sense of responsibility may be
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remove some of the incentive, seem to be antithetical to the instru-
mentalist form of Lockean labor theory. This is only true, however, if
there is no windfall inherent in the rewards to labor. Windfalls by
definition are unexpected and unpredicted and should have no effect
on incentives. The windfall portion of market prices is analogous to
economic rent-that part of, say, an individual's salary that exceeds
the price the individual could command in the next best activity.124 If
a lawyer is willing to work for $45,000 a year, the lawyer will probably
be delighted to work for $200,000 a year. The additional $155,000 per
year does not perform the instrumentalist function of inducing the
lawyer to practice law; it is more like a windfall or a bonus.125 To the
extent that taxes are taken out of this "windfall" amount, there should
be little or no effect on the lawyer's willingness to engage in the prac-
tice of law. Of course, at least some of the lawyers working for
$200,000 would, at least in theory, not work for less.
In fact, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the motiva-
tion for working more or harder is not greatly dependent on the abso-
lute monetary compensation for making the effort. The possibility of
greater consumption is not likely to be a motivating factor, particu-
more important. At lower income levels, workers may not have the option of
changing the amount of work supplied, since most jobs require a fixed time com-
mitment. Finally, the "income effect" may operate at low income levels. The in-
come effect is the tendency of some workers to work more hours as the after tax
wage goes down in order to maintain a constant standard of living. See Bankman
& Griffith, supra note 16, at 1922-26 (explaining that work helps determine social
standing and self-esteem and reviewing studies of compensated elasticity of labor
showing that elasticity of labor is generally lower, but higher for married women)
(citing Gramm, Labor, Work, and Leisure: Human Well-Being and the Optimal
Allocation of Tinme, 21 J. ECON. IssuS 167, 175 (1987)); see also DAvm G. DAvIEs,
UNrrED STATES TAXES AND TAX POLICY 68 (1986); Stein, supra note 77, at 388-89
& n.42 (1992) (presenting table showing hours worked at different income levels).
124. Economics textbooks define "economic rent" as the earnings that exceed the op-
portanity cost of an activity. See HYAuN, supra note 84, at 386; STmVN M.
CRAFTON & MARGARET F. BRINIG, QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR LAWYERs 854-55
(1994); JOHN GowDY & SABaNE OIARA, ECONOMIC THEORY FOR ENvIRONI ,INTAi-
isTs 86 (1995) (defining economic profits as those profits over and above those
obtainable in the best alternative in the economy). In the case of labor, however,
opportunity cost may represent the value of foregone leisure, rather than some
other salary-paying occupation. If a lawyer's best paying alternative pays only
half as much as being a lawyer, but is more pleasant, then the lawyer's minimum
price for legal work should include inducement to give up that pleasure. For pur-
poses of my argument, it is the difference between the lawyers minimum price
for being a lawyer and what the lawyer actually receives that is relevant. This is
only a portion of the "economic rent" that the lawyer receives if economic rent is
calculated using only monetary compensation (as opposed to utility).
125. The market is supposed to work this way. The price increases until there are jnst
enough lawyers. I do not mean to suggest that this function is inappropriate;
rather, that for all except the very last lawyer to enter the market, the price




larly for very high income earners. 126 At some level of income, pre-
sumably, greater consumption is difficult at best. Christopher Carroll
notes, for example, that Bill Gates would have to spend more than $10
million a day simply to avoid further accumulation.12 7 Carroll also
notes that very wealthy people make references to "having
enough."'128 Although a diminished interest in greater consumption
does not necessarily translate into a lack of interest in more money, it
does suggest that the incentive to work more and earn more at some
point comes from something other than the desire to eat more
acorns.
1 29
For example, in a study of affluent male workers, Robert Moffitt
and Mark Wilhelm reported no change in hours worked in response to
changes in marginal tax rates between 1983 and 1989.130 Moffitt and
Wilhelm speculate that these workers are working so many hours al-
ready that they cannot respond to lower tax rates by working more. 13 1
In other words, taxes did not seem to be depressing the number of
hours these workers worked before rates were lowered. These find-
ings are also consistent with the possibility that at least part of a high
salary does not serve an ongoing incentive purpose. Carroll suggests
several other motivations for work, namely, job satisfaction, philan-
thropic ambitions, and power-lust.132
Robert Frank has also argued that a primary incentive for market
effort is relative performance. Relative standing in terms of income
and wealth is more significant than one's actual absolute standard of
living.13 3 Further empirical evidence based on cross-cultural studies
does not support the notion that higher tax rates result in less work
effort. 1 3 4
Thus as long as greater effort results in some improvement in posi-
tion and in some increase in wealth after tax, imposition of tax does
not confound the role of incentive as a motivator for productive effort.
Of course, a tax that simply confiscated all income above some level
would be inappropriate because it would completely eliminate incen-
126. See CHRISTOPHER D. CARROLL, WHY Do THE RICH SAVE So MUCH? 23 (National
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6549, 1998).
127. See id. at 18.
128. Id.
129. In some cases, the challenge of earning more for its own sake may provide some
incentive to increase productive activity.
130. See MoFFrrr & W IHELM, supra note 42, at 41.
131. See id.
132. See CARROLL, supra note 126, at 19.
133. See ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE
QUEST FOR STATUS (1985). Professor Frank suggests that most people would be
less than satisfied to move from a standard of living that is higher than that of
their neighbors to a higher standard of living well below that of all of the new
neighbors.
134. See FRANK, supra note 42.
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tives and would fail to reward high-income efforts at all. But some
degree of progressivity would be acceptable so long as greater effort
results in some after-tax increase.
B. Why Taxes Don't Interfere with the Desert Version of
Lockean Theory Either
The analysis under the desert view of property is similar. The em-
phasis is simply shifted from reward as necessary to induce effort to
reward as moral desert. If effort deserves reward, then effort should
be rewarded. But once we recognize the role of luck or of society in the
accumulation of wealth, it is easy to see a fairness in taxing the re-
turns that do not stem purely from effort, even while embracing the
notion that effort deserves reward.
VIII. TAX THEORIES
As we have seen, the imposition of tax does not interfere with the
reasons for property as desert. Taxes that are not confiscatory do not
unreasonably reduce the incentive to engage in productive effort and
they do not eliminate the reward due to a virtuous worker. Income
taxes, in other words, are not inconsistent with a Lockean property
theory. One can respect individual autonomy and yet favor redistribu-
tive taxes.
We now shift perspective to the arguments that are used to sup-
port redistributive taxes, namely the benefit theory and the ability-to-
pay or equal sacrifice theory. These theories have been subject to crit-
icism from many corners, including my earlier work. I discuss them
here, though, because when they are examined through a lens of Lock-
ean property theory, the arguments against them seem less persua-
sive. There are two main problems with the usual theories. The first
is that whether or not the benefit theory can produce a fair result de-
pends partly on which version of Locke one starts with. A view that
there is no social increment windfall to income produces a conclusion
that the benefit theory does not justify graduated taxes. A view that
takes luck and effort into account would redeem the benefit theory at
least on this count. The second problem with the usual theories is
largely an empirical one. Both sacrifice and benefit theories rely on
internally subjective variables. The sacrifice/ability-to-pay theories
depend on assumptions about the marginal utility of income curves of
different taxpayers. The benefit theory depends on the value of gov-
ernment to the taxpayer. Because the value to the taxpayer of having
government control or regulation of markets and infrastructure is al-
most impossible to measure and is probably somewhat subjective, the
benefit theory uses income as a proxy for benefit received. But using
income to determine the fairness of a tax on income is circular at best.
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A. The First Tax Theory Problem: Benefit Theory
This section will review representative arguments of the anti-
redistributionist approach1 35 and will show how they are colored by a
philosophical position that makes no distinction between the rewards
of effort and the rewards of luck. The benefit theory of taxation
merely states that government should not be allowed to extract more
from an individual in taxes than it provides in benefits.136 The ques-
tion thus becomes, how much benefit does government bestow, and
upon whom? Proponents of progressive taxes have sometimes argued
that high-income individuals receive more benefit from government
than do low income individuals.137 Extreme opponents of progressiv-
ity argue, however, that the benefit theory cannot justify any tax
structure that requires high-income individuals to pay more tax than
low-income individuals.138 Thus, even many regressive rate struc-
tures would violate the benefit theory because the poor, could it only
be proven, would be seen to receive more benefits than the wealthy.139
135. Although I focus on Professor Schoenblum's arguments, he is not alone in making
them, although as he points out, law review articles are more likely to argue in
favor of redistribution than against it. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 223 n.12
(stating that most of the academic literature uncritically supports progressivity).
136. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 769. See generally Radin, supra note 39.
137. As I have emphasized before, however, the benefit theory only justifies progres-
sive taxes if the level of benefits rises faster than the level of income; in other
words, if the wealthy receive not only more benefits, but disproportionately more
benefits than the poor. The benefit theory would call for proportionate taxes (a
"fiat tax") if the wealthy receive proportionately more benefits, if the level of ben-
efits rises proportionate to income. Note that it is possible for benefits to rise
with income, but at a slower rate. The tax rate structure in such case would be
regressive. High-income individuals would pay more taxes than low income
folks, but the taxes would be a smaller part of that high income. See Byrne, supra
note 6, at 770.
138. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 226. Less extreme opponents of progressivity
argue only that the benefit theory cannot justify progressive taxes, although it
could, presumably justify higher absolute taxes (whether regressive or propor-
tionate) on higher incomes.
139. It is sometimes difficult to sort out the arguments against the benefit theory of
taxation. Professor Schoenblum, for example, clearly does not believe the prem-
ise that rich people benefit more from government than poor people, but he does
not exactly say what he would think if it could be proven empirically that such
were the case (and of course that the amount of benefits rose faster than income).
Philosophically, Professor Schoenblum seems to approach the benefit theory from
a contractarian perspective. Taxation is justified as if individuals had contracted
with the state for the provision of services. A problem arises with this justifica-
tion for taxes to the extent that an individual prefers not to purchase some bene-
fits. Professor Schoenblum acknowledges that it would be impossible not to
provide benefits for which an individual did not wish to contract. Because some
benefits must be provided, however, some taxation is appropriate. See Schoen-
blum, supra note 1.
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The actual examples of benefit typically presented to show that the
poor receive more benefit than the rich bear examination.1 40 This
view is consistent with a philosophy of entitlement to wealth that
makes no distinction between wealth acquired because of exertion and
wealth acquired because of one's natural endowments, or because of
the luck of being in the right place at the right time. Since, in this
view, society plays no role in income disparities, high income folks re-
ceive little or no indirect benefit as a result of social forces, the mar-
kets, or government. Rather, all differences in income are the result of
differences in industriousness.
On the other hand, the great benefits that the poor receive are, by
and large, empirically determinable transfer payments. Means-tested
programs, public education, public transportation, and health care are
all examples of the benefits that flow to poor people, but not to rich
people.' 41 Furthermore some government programs or policies are
even detrimental to the interests of wealthy people. For example, for-
eign trade policies that are designed to protect domestic labor may be
detrimental to the interests of high-income owners of business capi-
tal.142 Finally, many government benefits, although available to rich
and poor alike, are of greater benefit to the poor because the poor have
no choice but to rely on government provision of some services. For
example, rich people can pay for home security systems and are thus
less dependent on local police protection.1 43 Similarly, high income
individuals are more likely to use private mailing services rather than
the U.S. Postal Service.144 Moreover, since the services provided to
low-income people often are necessary for survival, they must surely
have a higher utility value to the poor than they would to the rich.i45
Thus, Lockean libertarians see only the direct benefits going to
poor people, and not the indirect ones going to the wealthy. In part,
they cannot see indirect benefits going to the wealthy because they
believe as a philosophical matter that all income earned by the high
140. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 226.
141. See 1d. ("Mlany government programs are means-tested, thus limiting benefits
that flow to the higher income earners.").
142. See id. at 227 ("[Ilnsular trade and other policies, responsive to the demands of
political majorities or special interest groups, may even be detrimental to the
economic interests of many high income earners.").
143. See id. at 126-27 ("When persons are required to incur significant personal expen-
diture for security devices and insurance... the contention that high income
earners particularly benefit from a safe society is not a compelling argument.").
144. See id. at 228 ("[High income earners who do not avail themselves of the infra-
structure may be required to incur substantial additional costs to obtain reliable,
quality services; examples include Federal Express, UPS, e-mail, and private
schools.").
145. Note, however, that this "value" is not the same as "value" from a market per-
spective. For a service to have value from a market perspective, there must be
someone who is both willing and able to pay for the service.
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income folks is the result of enormous effort and is, therefore, morally
deserved. The notion that an organized society itself could be a con-
tributor to the success of the successful is simply incompatible with
such beliefs about entitlement to wealth.i 46 The belief that success is
the result of individual worthiness and effort is evident from the ex-
amples chosen to rebut the benefit theory. For example, a worker who
works overtime and does good work is compared to a "slothful, sloppy"
employee who performs at the "minimum tolerable level of quality."'47
Similarly a doctor who got where she was through "studying and suf-
fering considerable self-denial" is compared to her less successful
friends who spent their time "partying" and exhibiting a "lack of will-
power and determination."148 One scholar poses the question explic-
itly: "what if lack of achievement is largely ascribable to choice?" 14 9
Thus it is effort, and effort alone that is to be regarded as responsible
for accumulation of wealth.
Notwithstanding the assumption that effort, and effort alone, gives
rise to income, anti-redistributionists argue that one of the most im-
portant ways that the poor benefit more from government than the
rich is that our strong national defense provides an "environment with
opportunity."' 5 0 At least formally, the lower-income classes in the
United States have the opportunity to move up the economic ladder, a
possibility that would be formally foreclosed in some societies.' 5 ' The
extent to which this opportunity exists in practice is much less
clear.152 Nevertheless, crediting the poor with a benefit in the form of
opportunity while arguing simultaneously that the rich do not get rich
146. Professor Schoenblum addresses this point in one sense when he argues that
there is "no demonstrable correlation" between the success of the wealthy and the
accident of their being citizens or residents of the United States. Schoenblum,
supra note 1, at 227-28. To the contrary, successful individuals would be success-
ful anywhere and might even be more successful elsewhere with less governmen-
tal intervention. Id. Compare Schoenblum, supra note 1, with Rose, supra note
28, at 440 (a property regime makes everyone better off).
147. Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 261.
148. Id. Professor Schoenblum at least explicitly acknowledges that he is assuming
equal intelligence and economic backgrounds in an effort to show that achieve-
ment due to effort deserves reward.
149. Id. at 263 (Schoenblum presenting the reader with situations where the diligent
are rewarded and the lazy have rough lives because the determinate factor of
success in society is the free exercise of autonomous choice).
150. Id. at 227. It seems, however, that Professor Schoenblum has failed to recognize
the possibility that such defense of the system could be the preservation of the
status quo where the top of society holds the vast majority of the wealth. This
would be to argue that the poor benefit from having power structures protected
that have roots in the institutions of racism, sexism, and classism.
151. See id.
152. See McMahon & Abreu, supra note 5, at 31 (citing evidence showing that "[t]op to
bottom mobility is ... quite rare, as is its converse, notwithstanding the emo-
tional appeal of the American Dream").
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because of greater opportunity in the U.S. seems at first to be
inconsistent.
But these positions are quite consistent with a desert theory that
treats all wealth obtained as the rewards to individual effort. If the
state or society or luck had nothing to do with, say, Bill Gates or Ross
Perot getting rich, then it is certainly not a benefit of government that
there was the opportunity to become affluent. Gates and Perot, so the
argument goes, would have gotten rich anywhere. On the other hand,
someone who makes subsistence level wages must be too lazy, stupid,
or busy partying to be troubled to go make a decent living.153 The
existence of the opportunity to acquire wealth is necessary to the view
that essentially blames the individual for any measure of economic
failure. It is a disguised way of assuming that individuals have equal
capabilities. Those who are very sure that high-income people have
high incomes because of their own efforts and that luck plays no role
can thus confidently say that the benefit theory does not allow "une-
qual" taxation, and certainly not progressive taxation.15 4
B. The Second Tax Theory Problem: Measurement
The second problem with the usual theories is one of measurement.
Both are based on the value or amount of an intangible, subjective
variable that is largely personal to the taxpayer. The benefit theory,
even if we could agree on what "benefits" are benefits, depends on the
"value" to the taxpayer of the benefit received.15 5 There are several
problems inherent in this concept of benefit. First, taxpayers may re-
ceive benefits they don't want. If the benefit theory is seen as taxpay-
ers purchasing benefits with their tax dollars, the involuntary
purchase presents a challenge. There is, generally speaking, no way
153. But see Jeremy Waldron, Property, Justifictation, and Need, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS-
PRUDENCE 185, 204 (1993) (deriding the notion that poverty is the victim's own
fault).
154. There is no need for a further, more philosophical, argument that would explain
why the benefit theory as a theory is misguided. There is such an argument
available, and Schoenblum mentions it. The benefit theory derives from con-
tractarian notions of the state, according to which taxation is the price for having
some central provision of defense and some other services, and presumably most
individuals voluntarily would enter into such a "contract." But taxation is not
voluntary; there is no real possibility of "opting out." Accordingly, a "contract"
does not really exist between the individual and the state and regardless of the
amount of benefit conferred, one should not be compelled to pay taxes for un-
wanted benefits. In other words, the state has no moral claim on part of an indi-
vidual's wealth simply because it has provided some benefits. See Schoenblum,
supra note 1, at 232.
155. Note that it is the value to the taxpayer and not the cost to government that
matters, since the point of the benefit theory is to justify the contribution the
taxpayer will make in return.
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to opt out of the provision of government.' 5 6 Even libertarian liberals
recognize a role for some taxation to support government, whether the
taxpayer approves or not.'57 Second, benefits that do not have a mar-
ket price may nevertheless have value. In some cases the existence of
government may increase the taxpayer's utility, for example, by pro-
viding a sense of security, clean air, transportation for employees or
visitors. If so, any successful measure of total utility or satisfaction
would also give a pretty good measure of benefit.158 In other cases
government provides benefits that should have market value, but that
are almost impossible to measure, such as clear air and the sound of
birds singing that result from pollution control measures.
The measurement problem applies even more clearly to the ability-
to-pay/sacrifice theories. One of the reasons that we are still discuss-
ing progressivity after all of these years is that we insist on trying to
justify a progressive structure with some sort of utility measure. This
is like trying to make the trousers fit by sucking in your stomach. It
seems to make some intuitive sense, and it would be great if it really
worked, but in the final analysis it's not a good fit. There is no way to
measure utility absolutely. Although we can rank an individual's
preferences in order of priority, we have no way satisfactorily to assign
absolute comparative rankings. Further, we cannot compare utility
between taxpayers. Some theorists get around this problem by as-
suming it away. Others approach the problem as if only utility that is
backed by market purchases counts.' 5 9 But the parameter of utility
can only be defined from the inside out, by the individual taxpayer.
An individual without the means to participate in the market has lit-
tle input into the assigning of values. Accordingly, utility does not
provide a very good measuring stick for discussing tax rates with
those who are generally opposed to taxation.
Thus even if one believes that respect for individuals is consistent
with recognizing the role of luck and of society in producing wealth
156. Expatriation, being a hermit in the woods, joining a self-government religious
community. All of these are imperfect.
157. See generally NozicK, supra note 1.
158. Indeed, one of Professor Schoenblum's criticisms of the ability-to-pay theory is
that it is the benefit theory in disguise. See Schoenblum, supra note 1, at 233.
159. Market prices do not even tell the whole utility story for market purchasers. Pur-
chasers only pay the price that the seller asks. In many cases, a buyer would be
willing to pay more than market price. For these inframarginal buyers, the mar-
ket price understates utility. Similarly, some sellers may be willing to take less
than the market price. In such cases the market price overstates the utility the
seller attached to the item sold. Thus there is always consumer surplus and pro-
ducer surplus. For example, in the movie Pretty Woman, Richard Gere and Julia
Roberts agree that she will stay for a week in return for $3000. After the deal is
closed, she proudly reports that she would have stayed for $2000. He smugly
replies that we would have paid $4000. See PRm=r WoMAN (Touchstone Pictures
1990).
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such that wealthy folks get more benefits from government or even if
we accept one of the ability-to-pay theories as a theory, if only it could
be measured, we are still doomed to the conclusion that the case for
progressivity is uneasy at best. The problem here is that there is no
externally measurable factor that determines fairness. There should
be. Fairness inherently involves interpersonal comparisons and
would seem to require some basis external to the person for making
the comparison. That factor cannot be income or wealth alone. Some-
where we need to decide when it is fair to require that wealth be redis-
tributed and when it is not.
IX. TAX FAIRNESS FROM THE OUTSIDE
If we are trying to determine from the outside what is fair, then the
measure that we use should also be somehow externally determined.
Several possibilities suggest themselves. For example, personhood
could be the sole criterion for imposing tax. If an individual is a per-
son, then some amount of tax is expected. This criterion leads to Pro-
fessor Schoenblum's lump sum head tax. A dog would not pay tax, but
a human person would. Beyond that there is no basis for distinguish-
ing between individuals. This is the approach that Schoenblum advo-
cates. He argues that this is the only tax structure that would
preserve our respect for individual autonomy. The problem with such
an approach, of course, is that it is regressive with respect to income
or wealth. Poor people would pay a higher percentage of their wealth
than rich people would. The revenue raising potential of such a tax is
compromised by its regressivity. To raise enough revenue, the
amount of the tax would have to be so high that poor folks could not
pay it.
A second alternative might be a straightforward income tax. Per-
sonhood is taken as a given and within the category of persons, those
with more income would owe more tax, the amount of tax being pro-
portionate to the amount of income; a flat tax. A flat income tax suf-
fers from the same revenue raising limitation as the lump sum tax,
only to a lesser degree. The rate imposed would have to be high to
raise enough revenue. If we add a low-income exemption, we intro-
duce progressivity, and we have to decide where to draw the line on
the exemption. If a flat income tax were not tied to some underlying
concept, it would seem arbitrary. If it were tied to some underlying
concept such as utility, then we would have all the definitional
problems that we have now. Why base the tax on income? Why not an
increasing tax that is not proportionate to income? Although income
presents the virtue of being measurable, without some elaboration, it
is hard to see how it points to fairness.
Another alternative, and frankly, my favorite, would be to assign
levels of deservedness to different levels of income. This approach
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would be theoretically similar to Justice Breitel's social increment of
value approach in Penn Central.160 It attempts to distinguish the role
of effort from the roles of other factors in creating wealth.16 ' Whether
or not someone deserves income or shelter or anything else is surely a
matter of opinion. But it is probably also the subject of some degree of
societal consensus. Since it is a matter of external opinion, deserved-
ness does not present quite the same difficulties that utility does.
There is no need to look inside people's minds to determine the extent
to which they deserve their income. Rather, perhaps we could agree
on specific criteria for determining levels of deservedness. Income
that is highly deserved should have more protection from tax than in-
come that is barely deserved or that is a windfall.
For example, perhaps we would agree that everyone, even the lazy,
deserves some subsistence level of income absolutely. Thus, rather
than personhood as a criterion for tax liability, personhood would be-
stow a level of absolute deservedness of income. Many features of our
existing tax system and welfare system lend support to the claim that
agreement on this point would be possible. For example, the income
tax has consistently allowed for some sort of zero bracket; the earned
income tax credit has the further effect of exempting subsistence in-
come from payroll taxes. Flat tax proponents base the fairness of the
proposals partly on the presence of a large tax-free amount of income.
Even Professor Schoenblum in advocating his "absolutely equal" tax,
concedes that the tax should include an exempt amount for subsis-
tence income. The subsistence amount then would have the highest
level of deservedness and would be subject to the lowest level of taxa-
tion (or none).' 6 2 All other income would be subject to tax. An ex-
treme version of this approach would tax other income at 100%.
But if personhood were the only factor in determining deserved-
ness and deservedness were the only basis for the imposition of tax,
the result would be a strongly progressive tax-the personhood
amount would be taxed at 0%; all other income at 100%, much like the
equal marginal sacrifice tax, which also levels off income above a cer-
tain level. The difference is that a personhood exemption would be
based on objective facts rather than on an assumption about levels of
utility.
160. See supra notes 92 to 105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Penn
Central case and the social increment of value reasoning.
161. See Linda A. Malone, The Future of Transferable Development Rights in the
Supreme Court, 73 Ky. L.J. 759, 785 (1984-85) ("The most innovative section of
the... opinion... concluded that the base for computing a reasonable return
should exclude the 'social increment' of value attributable to the government's
activities rather than to private investment.").
162. The extent to which this level of deservedness requires public assistance is a sep-
arate issue from whether or not some basic amount of income should be exempt
from taxation.
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Personhood alone would be unsatisfactory as the sole determinant
of deservedness, however, because it would take no account of effort.
As studies have shown, people generally believe that the expenditure
of effort creates desert. But effort as a basis for desert would not yield
a minimum level of tax-free income. Rather, the amount of tax free
income (or highly deserved income) would depend on the units of effort
expended. This factor would create a flexible level of absolutely de-
served income-flexible because the amount of wealth an individual
deserves depends on the amount of effort the individual exerts. The
deserved amount of wealth per unit of effort would be somewhat fixed,
however, so that an hour of burger flipping in terms of effort should
create the same level of desert as an hour of law review article writing.
Basing entitlement to wealth on the number of hours of effort alone
leaves some problems unresolved, however. What hours count? Is
child-rearing counted? Or only market labor?163 If non-market activi-
ties count, which non-market activities? Although these problems are
significant, at least there is no need to fall back on the time-worn no-
tion of "utility" with its inherent subjectivity.164
To take this hours-of-effort approach to another level, the effort
consumed by time-consuming education and lifestyle sacrifices should
be accounted for somehow, so it may be that the law review article-
writing should carry a slightly higher level of desert than burger flip-
ping.16 5 The anti-redistributionist approach seems to be that educa-
tion and forbearance together describe all the variation in incomes,
and that no amount of accession to wealth is a result of anything but
effort or forbearance. Although it may be difficult to make a distinc-
tion between rewards to effort and rewards to luck, it seems a neces-
sary step.16 6
In reality, however, accession to wealth is often also a result of luck
in the form of innate intelligence, childhood advantage, native talent,
or pure serendipity. To the extent that wealth results from the exist-
ence of one or more of these forms of luck, people are much less likely
to agree on the deservedness of that wealth. Initially, then, income
resulting from luck would carry no additional deservedness, since the
individual did not make any choices that created this source of wealth.
Yet the individual does choose to apply the talent or intelligence in a
way that produces wealth for society, and people do tend to believe
that those with innate intelligence or talent deserve at least some of
163. See generally Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEo. L. J. 1571 (1996).
164. Now is the time for some time physicist to come forward and say that hours are
subjective.
165. The theory that bases desert on positive contribution to society would obviously
arrive at the opposite result.
166. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (N.Y. 1977)
("It is exceedingly difficult but imperative, nevertheless, to sort out the merged
ingredients and to assess the rights and responsibilities of owner and society.").
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the additional reward that flows to that talent in the presence of ef-
fort. Perhaps a talent premium is appropriate to induce people to ap-
ply their extra talents or intelligence. Accordingly, our deservedness
scale could increase with the uniqueness of the intelligence or talent
employed in making the effort. Because deservedness is a socially de-
fined parameter, however, there is no reason that it would have to rise
proportionate to intelligence or talent. Since innate intelligence and
talent depend on luck, they should have less influence on absolute de-
servedness than does effort.
The practical result of a system based on deservedness would be a
progressive tax schedule. Subsistence incomes, absolutely deserved as
an incident of personhood would be exempt or taxed at the lowest pos-
sible level. Income beyond this minimum, to the extent it is the result
of effort alone, say the number of hours worked times the minimum
wage, would be very highly deserved and subject only to minimal taxa-
tion. The amount of income in the effort category would be increased
somewhat to account for choices made along the way, such as lifestyle
economy to acquire education and training. Finally, income in the
luck category, to the extent it involves individual choice to apply wind-
fall resources, would be subject to a higher rate of taxation, and in-
come resulting from pure serendipity, brute luck (money falling out of
the sky and the like) would be subject to the highest rates of taxation.
Presumably, extremely high incomes result from luck to a much
greater extent than do lower incomes. For example, Bill Gates would
deserve some subsistence amount just by virtue of being a person. He
would deserve to be compensated for the eighty hours per week that
he spends working, which would create a deservedness level twice as
high as that of a forty hour per week burger flipper, and he would
deserve some higher amount of income because he has chosen to em-
ploy his intellect in such a way that it produces income. But a large
portion of his income would be subject to the highest level of taxation
reflecting the elements of luck or serendipity that went into his suc-
cess: being born with intelligence, being born to a part of society that
would give him access to computers, having the good fortune to latch
onto a hobby that could grow into something the rest of the world re-
ally needed, becoming a virtual monopolist.' 6 7 All of these factors
generate income beyond that resulting from application of effort, and
167. See BInL GATES ET AL., THE ROAD AHEAD (1996).
My argument is not that monopoly rents are immoral. Even antitrust law
recognizes that a person can lawfully become a monopolist through superior vi-
sion, skill, ingenuity and industry. If so, and if the person does not unlawfully
exploit the monopoly power, antitrust law does not object to the monopolist tak-
ing the profits the market will bear. My argument is that those profits carry a
lower degree of deservedness and that, therefore, subjecting them to a higher rate
of tax is not unfair.
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it is thus fair to tax that high income at higher rates than we would
tax a lower income.
This deservedness model has several advantages over the utility
based systems, over Schoenblum's head tax, and over the Hall &
Rabushka flat tax (a la Armey-Shelby). This system incorporates the
philosophical position that effort and forbearance are meritorious and
should be rewarded. It also incorporates the philosophical position
that by virtue of personhood alone, each individual is equally entitled
to something-a livelihood, respect, comfort. The deservedness model
leaves relative holdings intact. There is no net penalty for making
greater efforts. It does not rely on any internally determined factor
such as utility. While deservedness is abstract, it is an externally ab-
stract concept. Finally, people seem to believe that relative position
should not be disturbed-the wealthiest should remain the wealthiest
after imposition of tax. So our scale of absolute deservedness would
start above zero (reflecting the personhood amount), would rise in pro-
portion to effort (to reflect only the number of hours), and would rise
somewhat with the level of talent applied (to induce people to apply
unusual talent). With the deservedness model, then, the Lockean con-
nection between labor and wealth is preserved. But the roles of fac-
tors other than effort are also recognized.
X. CONCLUSION
What significance does deservedness have for the tax structure?
Dollars that are deserved more should be taxed less. Some subsis-
tence level of income should be free of tax, not because those dollars
have the greatest utility where they are, but because as human be-
ings, people absolutely deserve to have some minimum lifestyle.16s
The marginal deservedness of those first few dollars earned is very
high. The tax burden on those dollars should be very light. Highly
deserved dollars should generally not be taxed, or not much anyway.
As income rises purely through effort and industry, the marginal de-
servedness of income may decline somewhat, reflecting a societal judg-
ment that some balance is important. Or perhaps marginal
deservedness does not decline with returns solely to effort and indus-
try; perhaps we would agree that increased earnings that result
168. What that minimum should entail is also socially constructed. For example,
Thomas Jefferson thought that every adult should be entitled to an appropriation
of 50 acres in "full and absolute dominion." Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson
and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 470
(1976), excerpted in CuRTis J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAiS, PROPERTY:. LAND
OWNERSMIP AND USE (4th ed. 1997). I heard on public radio once that in the
Netherlands, a social minimum is defined as enough to provide shelter, food and
a daily newspaper. Query whether a daily newspaper would be considered a bare
necessity in other parts of the world.
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purely from working more hours should be taxed somewhat more
heavily. At some point, however, the role of increasing effort becomes
de minimis and luck and circumstance or returns to innate intellect
start to become more significant. A very low level of deservedness at-
taches to such income, yet these are the factors that produce huge
earnings increases.
By starting from the right position on Locke and using a measure-
ment that is externally determinable, the case for progressive taxation
becomes much easier. The opponent of progressive taxation must now
show first that the windfall of social increment of value is deserved
(and should not be taxed), and second that deservedness is not a cul-
turally derived norm.
